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Fire Plan
The Canadian Army’s Fire Support System  
in Normandy 
 
D AV I D  G R E B S T A D
Abstract : Consigned initially to a decentralized and limited tactical role, 
the fire support organizations of British and Canadian armies experienced 
exponential growth during the initial stages of World War II. By D-Day, fire 
support had become a critical enabler of Anglo-Canadian combat operations 
and artillery units were numerous, networked, and efficient. Facilitating 
successful tactical manoeuvre was the goal of the fire support system. This 
article will explore the ‘ways’ and ‘means’ of that system – the people, 
procedures, resources, and organizations that combined to produce the 
devastating battle-winning fire support that contributed to tactical success.
The contribution of the artillery to final victory in the German war has 
been immense. This will always be so; the harder the fighting and the 
longer the war, the more the infantry, and in fact all the arms, lean on 
the gunners. The proper use of artillery is a great battle-winning factor.1
At the outbreAk of the Second World War, British and Canadian fire support doctrine focussed on decentralised fire 
units supporting fluid, highly-mobile, infantry and tank manoeuvres. 
The disastrous Anglo-French campaign in France in May 1940 
and subsequent British reversals during the opening stages of the 
Desert Campaign in North Africa demonstrated the weakness 
1  Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery, quoted in Richard Doherty, Ubique: The 
Royal Artillery in the Second World War (Stroud: The History Press, 2008), 13.
© Canadian Military History, 2016
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2 The Canadian Army’s Fire Support System in Normandy
of this doctrine. Once the Allies halted the expansion of German 
forces and assumed the strategic offensive, thanks in no small part 
to a marked increase in deployed artillery assets, German skill at 
defensive operations forced the Anglo-Canadian armies to adopt 
an offensive tactical doctrine predicated on massive fire support. 
By the close of the Desert Campaign in North Africa in 1943, the 
pendulum of tactical doctrine had swung from a focus on manoeuvre 
to a focus on firepower. So fundamental was fire support to Allied 
battlefield success, the tactical doctrine employed by the Canadian 
Army in 1944 was, essentially, artillery-based.2 Thrust into this 
predominant role, the fire support organisations in the British and 
Canadian armies experienced exponential growth. By the start of the 
Normandy Campaign in June 1944, Anglo-Canadian artillery units 
were numerous, networked, and efficient. 
While the ends that were furnished by the artillery of the Anglo-
Canadian armies are generally well known, the ways and means of 
the fire support system are less so. Most historical works of Anglo-
Canadian operations in Normandy focus almost exclusively on the 
manoeuvre element, the infantry and armour formations of the 21st 
Army Group. Detailed surveys of the fire support hierarchy and how 
it was employed are wanting. The exceptions are artillery-specific 
works such as, but not limited to, Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson’s official 
history of the Royal Canadian Artillery, The Gunners of Canada; 
Major-General J.B.A Bailey’s Field Artillery and Firepower; 
Brigadier Shelford Bidwell’s Gunners at War, and Fire-Power, The 
British Army Weapons & Theories of War 1904–1945 (the latter 
with Dominick Graham); and of course George Blackburn’s excellent 
trilogy of first-hand accounts Where the Hell are the Guns?, 
The Guns of Normandy, and The Guns of Victory. While not 
exclusively artillery-based, retired Canadian artillery officer Brian 
A. Reid’s chapter entitled “Bullets and Bombs – The Fire Plan” in 
No Holding Back, Operation Totalize, Normandy, August 1944, 
is also instructive, although he does not delve into any great detail 
at the lower levels of the fires support organisation. Each of these 
worthy historical works only scratch at the surface of fire support 
tactics, techniques, and procedures: How was the artillery organised? 
How were fire plans and barrages planned and executed? How were 
2  Terry Copp, Fields of Fire, the Canadians in Normandy (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2003), 29.
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they controlled once the infantry crossed the start line? This article 
will attempt to shed light on the practices and procedures of the 
artillery organisation that delivered the all-important battle-winning 
fire support to the Canadian Army. It will begin with a review of 
the organisational structure of the artillery units and formations 
of the First Canadian Army, and then illustrate the processes and 
procedures that went into developing fire support plans. Finally, 
using the 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade’s attack on Verrieres Ridge 
on 19 July 1944 as a case study, this paper will demonstrate how the 
theory of fire support was put into practice. In doing so, this paper 
will provide a workable understanding of the fire support system 
employed by the Canadian Army in northwestern Europe that is not 
impenetrably technical.
the artillery system: from troop to corps
While this paper will focus on the elements that provided indirect 
surface-to-surface fire support, it is important to note that the artillery 
organisation also included anti-aircraft and anti-tank artillery units. 
As their names imply, the former prevented the German Luftwaffe 
from interfering in Canadian manoeuvres, while the latter provided 
anti-tank fire support to defeat German armour (see Figure i). These 
elements, combined with the field and medium artillery, which are 
the focus of this paper, constituted an immense fire support hierarchy 
within the Anglo-Canadian field armies.3 Obviously the roles and 
duties that existed within such a vast organisation were many and 
varied, thus our starting point will be the common denominator 
amongst all ranks of the artillery, the gun.4
The most abundant of field artillery pieces in the Anglo-Canadian 
arsenal in the spring of 1944 was the venerable 25-pounder howitzer. 
3  Field artillery was of smaller calibre consisting of the 25-pounder (88 mm) howitzer, 
while medium artillery was of larger calibre, specifically the 4.5-inch and 5.5-inch howitzers.
4  All artillery personnel, regardless of rank, are referred to, colloquially, as “gunners.” 
Whereas infantrymen are referred to as “privates,” or “riflemen” depending on the 
proclivities of their individual regiments, the term “gunner” is also used as the 
official title of the lowest-ranking members of the artillery. The term “gun” itself, 
while having a specific technical definition, has nonetheless come to represent any 
manner of field piece employed by the artillery. For these reasons, in this article, the 
terms “gun” and “howitzer” will be used interchangeably. 
3
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4 The Canadian Army’s Fire Support System in Normandy
The 25-pounder weighed 4,032 pounds and was capable of engaging 
targets in a 360-degree rotation due to an attached baseplate that, 
when lowered, allowed the gun to be rotated by the crew without 
displacing it. The range of the gun was impressive, it could fire its 
eponymous twenty-five-pound high-explosive projectile to a range of 
13,400 yards, and a smoke shell up to 11,000 yards.5 Doctrinally the 
“normal” rate of fire was three-rounds per minute; however, when not 
constrained by orders to adhere to a specific rate, a well-trained crew 
produced an impressive volley of fire in a short period, limited only by 
their efficiency and level of fatigue. The achievable rate of fire was so 
high that George Blackburn, an officer with the 4th Field Regiment, 
Royal Canadian Artillery (rcA) reported that two captured German 
soldiers asked permission to see the “automatic gun.”6 
The gun was operated by a detachment. Commanded by a 
sergeant, it consisted of a total of six personnel whose responsibilities 
were to deploy, maintain, aim, and fire their gun on orders issued by 
5  George C. Blackburn, Where the Hell are the Guns? A Soldier’s Eye View of the 
Anxious Years, 1939–44 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1997), 409.
6  George C. Blackburn, The Guns of Normandy, A Soldier’s Eye View, France 1944 
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1995), 436.
Figure i: The structure of a Canadian Divisional Artillery as of January 1943. It remained 
unchanged throughout the Normandy campaign. [Canada, National Defence, Army Headquarters 
Historical Report number 57, A Summary of Major Changes in Army Organization, 1939–1945] 
© David Grebstad, 2016.
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the gun position officer (gpo).7 The gun detachment members were 
known as “numbers” with each of the six men having a number that 
dictated their role in the detachment while also serving as a de facto 
title: the number one was the detachment commander; the number two 
operated the breech mechanism; the number three set the elevations 
and bearings on the sites, elevated and traversed the barrel, and fired 
the gun; the number four loaded the gun; and the numbers five and 
six cared for, prepared, and supplied the ammunition to number four 
for loading. Of course these were doctrinal duties and the detachment 
commander would, from time to time, rotate individuals from one 
position to another to manage crew rest and provide soldiers for local 
protection duties.8 
Tactical movement of the gun was provided by the gun tractor, 
specifically, the Morris four-wheel-drive field artillery tractor, branded 
colloquially by the gunners as the quad due to its four-wheel drive 
capability.9 The quad towed a square, box-like ammunition trailer, 
by 1944 the number 27 artillery trailer, that was positioned between 
the quad and the gun during movement and was used to store and 
transport thirty-two rounds of ammunition and propellant charges.10
In addition to the field artillery regiments, the Canadian Army also 
fielded a number of medium artillery units and formations as well. In 
the medium artillery, Canadian gunners manned one of two different 
pieces; a 4.5-inch howitzer that fired a 55-pound projectile up to a 
range of 20,000 yards, and a 5.5-inch howitzer that fired a 100-pound 
projectile to a range of 16,000 yards.11 Medium artillery batteries and 
regiments were allocated to higher echelon commands, such as corps 
and army, and were used to supplement the fire of divisional field 
7  UK War Office (WO), GS Publications 859, Artillery Training Volume III: Field 
Gunnery. Pamphlet No. 3 Part 1–Fire Discipline and Observation of Fire (London: 
War Office, 1942), 3.
8  UK WO, GS Publications 2251, Gun Drill for QF 25–PR Gun, Marks 2/1, 3/1 and 
4 on Carriage 25-PR, Marks 1 and 3 (London: War Office, 1956), 2–6.
9  Shelford Bidwell, Gunners at War (London: Arrow Books Ltd, 1972), 104.
10  Doug Knight, The 25-Pounder in Canadian Service (Ottawa: Service Publications, 
2005), 6.The 25-pound projectile was a “semi-fixed” projectile meaning it consisted 
of a projectile that was mated with a cartridge that had a number of charges which 
could be kept or removed to vary the muzzle velocity of the round and thus achieve 
different ranges and different angles of fire.
11  Leslie W.C.S. Barnes, Canada’s Guns An Illustrated History of Artillery (Ottawa: 
National Museums of Canada, 1979), 90–91.
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artillery.12 The British artillery included in its order of battle regiments 
of heavy artillery sporting 7.2-inch guns and larger, but the Canadian 
Army did not include these in its fire support organisations, although 
from time to time British heavy artillery units would be attached to 
Canadian artillery formations for specific operations.13
A moment must be taken to discuss an item of extreme 
importance to the fire support system: the artillery projectile. It may 
seem counter-intuitive, but the weapon of the artillery is not the gun, 
which is simply a delivery system, but is, in actuality, the projectile 
which is responsible for producing the desired effect on the target.14 
Artillery fire produces a number of different effects upon its targets, 
neatly summed up as suppression, neutralisation, and destruction. 
Different armies have defined these terms in manners that vary 
slightly, but the overall sense remains consistent: suppressing and 
neutralising fire prevent the enemy from moving, observing, or 
12  For a complete review of the development of medium artillery in the Canadian 
Army during the second world war, see Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson’s chapter “The 
Non-Divisional Artillery” in The Gunners of Canada, The History of the Royal 
Regiment of Canadian Artillery, Volume II 1919–1967 (Toronto: McClelland and 
Stewart, 1972), 108–131.
13  Ibid., 111.
14  J.B.A. Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 
2004), 10.
Gunners of the 7th Battery, 2nd Field Regiment, RCA, firing their 25-pounder guns at 
German positions, Nissoria, Italy, 23–28 July 1943. [Library and Archives Canada, 3259922]
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manning his equipment. The degree to which this is accomplished 
accounts for the difference between the two terms, the latter implying 
a slightly longer duration of the effect accompanied by a somewhat 
greater impact on materiél, while the former is fleeting and mostly 
psychological.15 Brigadier Shelford Bidwell, a British Second World 
War veteran who commanded a field battery of the Royal Artillery 
in both North Africa and Northwest Europe, described artillery’s 
neutralization effects thusly: 
[artillery fire] would kill the bolder riflemen and machine-gunners and 
frighten the rest, throw dirt in their faces, blind them with smoke, 
damage their weapons and drive them to the bottom of their trenches 
or into their dug-outs until the attackers were on top of them.16
The effect of destruction, as the term implies, involved the physical 
destruction of materiél and enemy personnel, and was best achieved 
by long sustained bombardments which were costly in both time 
and resources.17 
In addition to the high explosive rounds, the gunners also employed 
a number of specialty munitions, such as smoke and illumination 
projectiles, that produced unique effects on the battlefield. As their 
names imply, smoke projectiles produced a smoke screen that blinded 
the enemy and screened friendly manoeuvres, while illumination 
rounds ejected a parachute-equipped phosphorus flare at the apogee 
of their trajectory that lit up the battlefield and allowed friendly 
forces to observe the enemy during periods of darkness. In addition 
to these two specialty munitions, projectiles designed to be used in 
the direct-fire role against attacking tanks, known as armour-piercing 
shot, were available for the local defence of the gun position.18 
Despite being deployed several kilometres behind the front line, 
the artillery was nonetheless subject to the threat of an infantry 
or tank attack on the gun position, thus local defence from ground 
and air attack was a critical factor in determining the appropriate 
location of the gun position. In addition to the armour-piercing shot 
for the 25-pounders, each battery also had anti-aircraft light machine 
15  Ibid., 11.
16  Bidwell, Gunners at War, 77.
17  Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, 11.
18  Ian V. Hogg, The Guns 1939–45 (New York: Ballatine Books, 1970), 35.
7
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guns which were sited to the flanks to engage dive-bombing aircraft, 
as well as an anti-tank rifle and several Bren guns for protection 
from light armoured vehicles and infantry attacks respectively. In 
the event of an attack on the gun position, the howitzers themselves 
became rallying points for the defence of the battery and gunners were 
ordered to defend the guns “to the last man and the last round.”19
Returning now to the organisational hierarchy of the artillery, two 
guns comprised a section and consequently the individual guns were 
sometimes referred to as “sub-sections.” The two guns of a section 
travelled in three quads—two for towing the guns and carrying the 
numbers one-through-four of each detachment while the third quad 
carried the four remaining section personnel—the numbers five and 
six of each gun detachment.20 
The two sections comprised a four-gun troop that was commanded 
by a troop commander, normally ranked a captain, who deployed 
forward of the guns as a forward observation officer (foo). In his 
absence, the troop commander delegated the on-site command of the 
troop to the aforementioned gpo, a lieutenant, who was assisted in 
his duties by another junior officer, referred to as the troop leader, 
as well as the senior non-commissioned member of the troop, a 
staff sergeant or sergeant who held the position of the troop battery 
sergeant major (troop bsm).21 The hub of each troop of guns was the 
troop command post (cp) that was commanded by the gpo, or one 
of the junior officers, and manned by a team of non-commissioned 
personnel acting as technical assistants, and known colloquially as 
‘acks.’22 The cp was the technical nerve centre of the troop; it was 
here that the gpo aand the ‘acks’ produced the firing data, such as 
elevations, bearings, and fuze settings, which the guns required to hit 
19  UK WO, GS Publications 527, Artillery Training Volume I–Pamphlet No. 2B, 
RHA and Field Regiments, Battle Drill and Manoeuvre for the Reconnaissance and 
Occupation of Positions (hereafter Battle Drill and Manoeuvre) (London: War Office, 
1941), 15. It should be noted that the guns themselves are, ceremonially, the “colours” 
of the Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery. This originated in the practice of 
gunners rallying to the guns as their infantry brethren did to their own regimental 
colours. The injunction here to defend the guns at all cost was not universally 
followed and in France in 1940, 700 Royal Artillery field pieces were abandoned to 
the Germans as the British gunners evacuated from Dunkirk.
20  Ibid., 50.
21  Fire Discipline and Observation of Fire, 1. If the troop were lucky enough to have 
supplementary junior officers, they too would report to the GPO.
22  Blackburn, Where the Hell are the Guns?, 41.
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the target.23 While it was possible for guns to fire in the direct role, 
wherein the gun detachment can see the target they are engaging, 
often referred to as firing over open sites, by the end of the First World 
War such practice had fallen out of favour. As the accuracy and range 
of rifle fire improved during the latter years of the nineteenth century, 
batteries were forced to seek gun positions out of sight of enemy 
infantry, and later tanks, in order to ensure their survival. By the 
end of the First World War, indirect fire, wherein the gunners could 
not see their target due to distance or intervening terrain, became 
de rigueur.24 This necessitated some manner of forward observation 
to locate targets and transmit their coordinates to the applicable cp 
where trigonometric calculations produced gun aiming data.
Two troops constituted a battery which had its own cp that was 
linked by telephone wire and radio to two subordinate troop cps. The 
battery cp was commanded by a lieutenant called the command post 
officer (cpo) who was responsible for the deployment of the two gun 
troops of the battery. Additionally, along with his ‘acks’ called cpo/As, 
23  UK WO, Fire Discipline and Observation of Fire, 10–11.
24  For an excellent description of how the practice of direct fire was eventually 
replaced by that of indirect fire during the First World War see the chapter “Le 
Cateau” in Bidwell’s Gunners at War, 15–33.
Command post, 3rd Field Regiment, RCA during a training exercise, Shoreham-by-Sea, 
England, 27 March 1942. [Library and Archives Canada, 3560095]
9
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he carried out the necessary fire support calculations when the fire of 
all eight guns of the battery was required on a single target.25
In addition to the two troops of guns and the battery cp, , the 
battery also included support and sustainment elements such as the 
all-important ammunition trucks, and a ‘B’ echelon consisting of the 
battery quartermaster, mechanics, cooks, and all the vital supporting 
elements required for the battery to shoot, move, and communicate. 
These elements were deployed in a laager known then, as now, as the 
wagon lines, a term that pays homage to the hippomobile origins of 
the artillery. In addition to these support elements, the gun-tractor 
quads also moved to the wagon lines after dropping the guns off at 
their firing positions.26
Ammunition resupply was a critical factor in the provision of 
fire support; naturally, as the demand for fire increased, the need for 
vehicles to resupply the firing batteries did as well. Most ammunition 
resupply was the responsibility of the Royal Canadian Army Service 
Corps, especially in the delivery of ammunition from division, corps, 
and army ammunition dumps. However, within a field artillery 
regiment each battery was allocated four 3-ton ammunition lorries to 
pull ammunition from forward dumping areas to the battery positions. 
Three of these vehicles carried ammunition, dividing a total of 480 
rounds between them, while the fourth vehicle carried camouflage 
stores and petrol. Although these ammunition vehicles belonged to 
the battery, they were normally grouped at the regimental level under 
the direction of the regimental quartermaster sergeant and used as a 
single regimental ammunition group.27
The battery was the principal fire unit of the fire support 
organisation.28 In command of this robust organisation was the battery 
commander (bc) who held the rank of major. During operations, the 
battery commander delegated the hands-on command of the battery 
to his second-in-command, the battery captain, whilst he established 
an observation post and provided artillery advice to the infantry 
25  UK WO, Battle Drill and Manoeuvre, 5.
26  Ibid., 48–50.
27  Ibid., 4, 8, 38. There were no ammunition lorries allocated to an artillery regiment, 
only the batteries.
28  Ibid., 1.
10
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battalion commander.29 The battery captain was responsible for the 
deployment and administration of the whole of the battery including 
the gun groups and the echelon elements. On behalf of the battery 
commander, the battery captain deployed the battery in accordance 
with the orders of the regimental second-in-command (Regt 2ic).
At the outbreak of the war, each artillery regiment consisted of 
two, twelve-gun batteries, the legacy of an ill-conceived restructuring 
of the Royal Artillery (rA) in 1938 and subsequently adopted by 
the rcA.30 This structure, adopted with almost no input or advice 
from artillery leadership, complicated what was then, and remains 
today, a critical element of the artillery system: the provision of fire 
support coordination and advice to the manoeuvre arm commander.31 
Naturally, the two-battery organisation did not align with the three-
battalion structure of an infantry brigade, which resulted in the 
deplorable situation of an infantry battalion commander left without 
artillery advice and coordination. While bcs and foos could be moved 
from battalion to battalion as required, this practice did not allow 
for the development of the high degree of team cohesion and implicit 
trust that is necessary in combat operations and which only comes 
with routine and prolonged interaction. The implications of this 
oversight were readily apparent during the disastrous operations of 
the British and French armies during the German attack into France 
in 1940. Consequently, in December of that year, the organisational 
structure of a Canadian artillery regiment changed. In its newest 
incarnation, the artillery regiment assumed a more conducive and 
logical hierarchy of three, eight-gun batteries, each divided into two, 
four-gun troops. The object of this reorganisation was to simplify 
the deployment of fire units, expedite the delivery of fire support, 
reduce inaccuracies in fire, and centralise administration.32 More 
29  Ibid., 5. A battery commander could be tasked to support an armoured regiment 
as well, and thus would advise the commanding officer of the armoured regiment. 
For simplicity, throughout this paper we will only refer to the relationship between 
a battery commander and an infantry battalion commander.
30  Blackburn, Where the Hell are the Guns?, 55; Bidwell, Gunners at War, 128.
31  Bidwell, Gunners at War, 128.
32  UK WO, Battle Drill and Manoeuvre, 1.
11
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importantly, this new organisational structure allowed for a proper 
affiliation between batteries and infantry battalions.33 
An artillery regiment was commanded by a commanding officer 
(co) who was ranked lieutenant-colonel. Like his subordinate bcs, he 
too delegated the deployment, command and administration of the 
regimental gun groups and echelons to the aforementioned regimental 
second-in-command (2ic)—a senior major—while he co-located 
himself with his affiliated brigade commander.34 The regiment had 
a cp as well, commanded by the adjutant, a captain who was the 
co’s staff officer whose primary responsibility was to control the 
fire of the regiment.35 In addition to fire control, the adjutant and 
his assistants issued routine and operational orders to the batteries, 
which included the preparation of barrage maps and traces.36 An 
artillery regiment was a large and intricate organisation, the day-to-
day affairs of which were impossible for one man to coordinate. To 
support him in this endeavour, the co had a number of officers to 
assist in the administration and command of his regiment such as the 
aforementioned adjutant, a regimental quartermaster, an intelligence 
officer, a regimental survey officer, a signals officer, a technical 
adjutant, a paymaster, and a regimental medical officer.37
In the Canadian Army, the division was a self-contained force 
of all arms included its own supporting artillery organisation known 
as the divisional artillery, made up of three field regiments and the 
division’s allocation of anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery. While a 
British infantry division’s artillery component included a medium 
regiment, in the Canadian Army these units were allocated to corps 
33  Canada, National Defence, Army Headquarters Historical Report number 57, A 
Summary of Major Changes in Army Organization, 1939–1945, 24. Available at: www.
cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/his/rep-rap/doc/ahqr-rqga/ahq057.pdf, [accessed 12 
June 2015].
34  Shelford Bidwell & Dominic Graham, Fire-Power, The British Army Weapons and 
Theories of War 1904–1945 (Barnsly: Pen and Sword Military Classics, 2004), 253.
35  UK WO, GS Publications 1008, Artillery Training Volume III–Field Gunnery–
Pamphlet No. 2, Preparation for Opening Fire (hereafter Preparation for Opening 
Fire), (London: War Office, 1943), 4.
36  UK WO, Battle Drill and Maneouvre, 4.
37  Library and Archives Canada (LAC) RG 24-C-3, Vol. 14461 War Diary (WD), 
12th Canadian Field Regiment, “Regimental Orders Part I” dated 13 June 1944. 
This entry lists the appointments of regimental officers in the 12th Field Regiment 
which conforms to the doctrinal structure for a field artillery regiment.
12
Canadian Military History, Vol. 25 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 14
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol25/iss1/14
  13GREB S TAD
artillery.38 The head of the divisional artillery was a Brigadier with 
the title of commander Royal Artillery (crA) who was responsible for 
the employment of all artillery in his command. Assisted by a small 
divisional artillery staff, the crA advised the division commander 
on the proper employment of fire support and, when required, 
requested and then coordinated reinforcing fire from flanking and 
superior artillery organisations. Like his subordinates, the crA had 
a divisional artillery cp that was linked by radio, and if possible, 
telephone wire, to subordinate and flanking artillery cps, as well as 
the corps artillery cp. Any reinforcing artillery assigned to bolster 
the fire of the divisional artillery joined its radio network and respond 
to calls for fire as they came in.
Most reinforcing artillery came from either flanking divisional 
artilleries, or the Corps Artillery headquarters. At the Corps 
headquarters, the senior gunner was a Brigadier who carried the title 
commander corps Royal Artillery (ccrA) and carried out for the corps 
38  For a complete summary of the many changes to the organisation and structure 
of a Canadian division see the Canadian Military Headquarters Historical Section 
Report Number 57 A summary of major changes in Army organisation, 1939–
1945, available at: www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/his/rep-rap/doc/ahqr-rqga/
ahq057.pdf.
Figure ii: Organisation of a Field Regiment in the Anglo-Canadian armies. [UK WO, GS 
Publications 527, Artillery Training Volume I—Pamphlet No. 2B, RHA and Field Regiments, Battle Drill 
and Manoeuvre for the Reconnaissance and Occupation of Positions]
13
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commander the same functions of advice and coordination as the 
crA did for the division commander.39 The corps artillery consisted 
of a regiment of anti-aircraft artillery and a regiment of anti-tank 
artillery which the ccrA could allocate to subordinate formations 
as the situation dictated. In addition to these two units, the ccrA 
had under his command a subordinate medium artillery formation 
known as an Army Group—Royal Artillery (AgrA).40 Following the 
example of the rA, in the fall of 1942 the Canadian Army created 
two AgrAs, the 1st Canadian AgrA in support of the First Canadian 
Corps and 2nd Canadian AgrA in support of the Second Canadian 
Corps. In these AgrAs the Canadian Army brigaded three medium 
artillery regiments, one equipped with 4.5-inch howitzers and the 
other two with 5.5-inch howitzers, each consisting of two, eight-gun 
batteries.41 The AgrAs provided the ccrA a robust artillery “punch” 
that he directed towards the corps commander’s main effort and thus 
supplemented the fire of the divisional artillery.42 The creation of the 
AgrA in 1942 was major step in the evolution of artillery doctrine 
in the Second World War. Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson observed in the 
official history of the Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery that the 
“important contribution that the creation of the AGRA [made] towards 
perfecting the rapid concentration of artillery fire—[was] a contribution 
that would rank high among the factors that led to final victory.”43
At the very top of the Canadian Army’s fire support hierarchy 
was the brigadier Royal Artillery (brA)—First Canadian Army. Like 
the crA and ccrA, the brA advised the army commander on the use of 
artillery and had under his direct command two field artillery regiments 
known as the 11th and 19th Army Field Regiments, rcA. These units 
provided the flexibility for the brA to bolster the fire of the subordinate 
fire support formations and were often detached to reinforce either a 
corps or divisional artillery as required.44 For example, the 11th Army 
39  Later in the war, the Canadian artillery would adopt the title CRCA – Commander 
Royal Canadian Artillery and CCRCA, Commander Corps Royal Canadian Artillery.
40  Nicholson, The Gunners of Canada, 649. The question of how the name AGRA 
came about is somewhat nebulous and the inclusion of the term “army group” is 
unfortunately confusing given that this was a resource usually delegated to a corps. 
As in note 35 above, later in the war these formations adopted the title Army Group 
Royal Canadian Artillery (AGRCA).
41  Ibid., 649.
42  Ibid., 111.
43  Ibid., 111.
44  Ibid., 647.
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Field Regiment, rcA was attached to 1st AgrA and sent to support Ithe 
First Canadian Corps in Italy, while 19th Army Field Regiment, rcA 
was “grouped” with the field regiments of the 3rd Canadian Divisional 
Artillery (the 12th, 13th and 14th Field Regiments, rcA) in support 
of the two assaulting brigades (the 7th and 8th Canadian Infantry 
Brigades) on D-Day in order to ensure each brigade had two field 
regiments in support.45 Considering the organisations from sub-section 
up to the brA, the First Canadian Army had a robust fire support 
organisation available to support it during operations in Normandy. 
How the fire of these numerous elements was coordinated to support 
Canadian manoeuvres is the question we next turn our attention to.
coordination of fire support
While the guns and organisational structure of the artillery were the 
means of Canadian Army fire support, the ways of the artillery system 
existed in the coordination between the artillery commander or 
forward observer and his supported infantry or armoured commander. 
The lowest level of coordination was the troop commander who 
acted as a foo, whilst conducting operations. The foo, supported 
by an assistant known as the observation post assistant (opA) and 
two radio operators, established an observation post linked by radio 
and telephone wire to their respective troop cps. From this post the 
foo maintained continuous observation over a particular zone of the 
battlefield as directed by the bc, reported activity to the troop and 
battery cps, and of course engaged targets with artillery fire.46 During 
mobile operations, such as a set-piece attack, the troop commander 
advised an infantry company commander and coordinated fire 
support in order to facilitate the company commander’s manoeuvre 
plan. The battery commander, likewise assisted by an opA and two 
radio operators, also established an op that was linked to one of 
45  Ibid., 111; Colonel C.P. Stacey, Official History of the Canadian Army in the 
Second World War Volume III The Victory Campaign The Operations in North-West 
Europe 1944–1945 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1960), 37. The four regiments that 
supported the assault on D-Day created two ad hoc and non-doctrinal organisations 
known as the 12th and 14th Regimental Artillery Groups comprising the 12th 
and 13th Field Regiments in the former and the 14th Field and 19th Army Field 
Regiments in the latter.
46  UK WO, Battle Drill and Manoeuvre, 10.
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the troop cps by radio or telephone wire. For operations, the bc 
provided support, advice, and coordination to his affiliated infantry 
battalion commander. 
It is important to reiterate that while troop and battery cps 
were linked together by telephone wire and radio, each battery cp 
was linked to its superior regimental cp, that was in turn linked to 
the divisional artillery cp, and so on to the corps artillery cp. This 
intercommunication from the troop to the corps cp ensured that the 
transmission and relay of data from the foo to high-level artillery 
cps happened in a matter of minutes and greatly facilitated the rapid 
engagement of targets with overwhelming fire.47 
Naturally, there were more targets than guns available to engage 
them and it was critical to concentrate artillery fire at the most 
important part of the battlefield, rather than distribute it across the 
whole front and dilute its effects. Therefore, in order to expedite the 
process of engaging targets, and to ensure that fire was directed 
to the most important part of the battlefield, from time to time 
certain artillery commanding officers were delegated as the “crA’s 
representative,” invariably shortened in parlance to simply crA’s rep. 
When so designated, the delegated officer linked his radio directly to 
the divisional artillery cp where, by convention, he was understood 
to have the priority of fire from all the guns of the divisional artillery. 
Thus, in a matter of minutes, the crA’s rep could have seventy-two 
guns respond to a call for fire.48 Shelford Bidwell neatly observed 
in Gunners at War that: “in sophisticated guise and reanimated 
by electronics, Napoleon’s Grand Battery returned to dominate 
the battlefield.”49 This was more than just a superficial comparison. 
Whilst in command of the 8th Army in North Africa, Montgomery 
issued direction that the crA was to employ the divisional artillery 
as a seventy-two gun battery.50
The nature of the fire employed is critical to the understanding of 
the fire support system, so it is important here to note the difference 
between adjusted fire and predicted fire. There is an inherent dispersion 
47  Bidwell and Graham, Fire-Power: The British Army Weapons & Theories of War 
1904–1945, 253.
48  Bidwell, Gunners at War, 149; John A. English. The Canadian Army and the 
Normandy Campaign. A Study of Failure in High Command (New York: Praeger, 
1991), 162–163.
49  Bidwell, Gunners at War, 149.
50  Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, 306.
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in all artillery fire caused by a variety of factors including such diverse 
elements as air density, the temperature of the propellant charge on the 
gun platform, the wear of the gun barrel, wind speed, and even minute 
human errors in the laying of the gun. All of these non-standard 
conditions contribute to a natural inaccuracy that is impossible to 
fully account for, and which creates a natural imprecision in the 
fall of shot.51 To compensate for these variations, artillery forward 
observers corrected for these inaccuracies through ranging—a method 
of observing the fall of shot of the engaging batteries and adjusting 
it, through corrections to range and bearing, to land on the target.52 
Predicted fire, on the other hand, is not previously adjusted 
and the gun data is calculated trigonometrically based on the grid 
location of the target, usually derived from intelligence collection, 
and the surveyed location of the firing battery. The inherent errors 
mentioned above can be minimised through the accurate survey of the 
gun position, exactness in the determination of the target location, 
and timely measurements of meteorological conditions. Regardless, 
these errors can never be fully accounted for and, consequently, 
predicted fire is not guaranteed to be precise.53 This lack of precision 
is compensated for by the use of mass to saturate the area with fire 
ensuring, through sheer volume, some degree of effect on the target. 
This saturation was only achievable when the aforementioned system 
enabled the concentration of a vast number of guns.54
This was the system that made the artillery so effective; it allowed 
the Canadian formations to concentrate fires and suppress objectives 
during attack, and then cut the inevitable counterattack to pieces 
with defensive fire.55 This doctrine, which has become known as bite 
51  The question of artillery ballistics is one of some detail and impossible to delve into 
here. For an excellent technical review of the various effects of non-standard conditions 
on artillery fire see the Canadian Department of National Defence publication B-GL-
306-006/FP-001 Field Artillery Volume 6 Ballistics and Ammunition, available at: 
https://docs.google.com/file/d/0BwiH9lNsdxTZZWQyNGYyNmMtZmUyMS00Ym
Y1LTkyYTktMjJhOTI2MzgzNjlk/edit?pli=1, [last accessed 16 March 2015].
52  UK WO, GS Publications 859, Artillery Training Volume III – Field Gunnery 
–Pamphlet No. 3, Part I: Fire Discipline and Observation of Fire (London: War 
Office, 1942), 40.
53  Terry Copp, Cinderella Army: The Canadians in Northwest Europe 1944–1945 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 189.
54  Bidwell, Gunners at War, 146.
55  Roman Johann Jarymowycz, “Der Gegenangriff von Verrieres. German 
Counterattacks during Operation ‘Spring’: 25–26 July 1944,” in Canadian Military 
History 2, no. 1, (Spring 1993), 76
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and hold, was the only effective solution to the problem of implacable 
German defences and counter attacks.56 Infantry would charge forward 
under the cover of a barrage that suppressed German defenders. Upon 
reaching the objective, the Canadian infantry prepared hasty defensive 
positions in which killing zones were established by integrating machine-
gun and anti-tank arcs of fire designed to defeat the inevitable German 
counter-attack. As the Germans emerged from their trenches to assault 
the Canadians, they exposed themselves to artillery defensive fire and 
“S.O.S.” missions—concentrations of artillery fire directed by foos 
onto the counter-attacking German forces.57 
Although incredibly effective, artillery was not a panacea. Barrages 
expended tonnes of ammunition, the majority of which never landed 
anywhere near the enemy.58 The majority of fire missions were fired 
unobserved, on predicted coordinates, often with little to no effect.59 
Despite these drawbacks, when the rounds did find their targets, 
artillery was the critical enabler that allowed Allied manoeuvre units 
to achieve tactical success. We turn now to a study of the doctrine 
behind how barrages were planned during operations in Normandy.
the barrage: the textbook structure
Barrage … The word has come to be loosely used for any heavy 
concentration of gunfire, when, in fact, it has precise and exact meaning.60
Starting in the First World War, and remaining in force during 
the Second World War, the barrage became the primary means by 
which fire support was provided to infantry and armour attacks.61 As 
Second World War  rA bc Ian Hogg observed above, it was more than 
simply an excessive expenditure of ammunition; a barrage was a very 
detailed and deliberate fire plan that required a great deal of team 
56  Terry Copp, “Bite and Hold,” Legion Magazine 84, no. 1, (2009), 28–30.
57  Lee Windsor, “Updating the Official Gospel: Canadian Military History’s Third 
Wave” Acadiensis 33, no. 2, (Spring/Summer 2004).
58  Ian V. Hogg, Barrage, the Guns in Action (New York: Ballatine Books, 1970), 34–
51. Hogg gives an excellent, technical account of the means and results of barrages 
during the Second World War.
59  Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, 312.
60  Ian Hogg, Barrage: The Guns in Action, 8.
61  Ibid., 8–33.
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work and coordination to implement. During the Second World War, 
fire plans consisted of both barrages and concentrations, although the 
term barrage was often used synonymously to refer to the fire plan. 
Strictly speaking, a barrage differed from a “concentration” wherein 
the fire of multiple batteries was directed onto a single point in order 
to concentrate an overwhelming effect. To expedite the engagement 
of concentrations the number of fire units requested were allocated 
a code word: Mike indicated a call for fire from all the guns of a 
regiment, Uncle for a division, Victor for a corps, and Yoke for the 
fire of an AgrA.62 Calls for fire were preceded by repeating the code 
word three times. For example: “Uncle Target, Uncle Target, Uncle 
Target…” followed by the target coordinates called for the immediate 
fire from all the guns of the divisional artillery.63
A barrage differed from a concentration in that it was deliberately 
planned, and distributed linearly as “a stationary or moving belt 
of fire providing a protective screen behind which the attackers 
advance.”64 The production of an artillery barrage in support of a 
deliberate attack was a very demanding process. Artillery Training 
Volume III: Field Gunnery Pamphlet No. 6 Programme Shoots 
(Barrages and Concentrations) dictated that in order to produce 
a quick regimental barrage, three hours of planning were required, 
including time to move batteries into firing positions. A divisional 
barrage required ten to twelve hours to coordinate, although a quick 
divisional barrage—one that was straightforward and involved a 
simple manoeuvre plan—could be executed in as little as two hours, 
if all of the supporting batteries were already deployed and did not 
have to move. At the corps level, twenty-four hours were required 
to coordinate the artillery plan.65 Needless to say, the planning of a 
barrage was a very calculated and command-driven exercise, thus, 
the best place to start an analysis of how a barrage was planned is at 
the top of the organisational hierarchy.
The first step in the planning of a barrage rested not with the 
artillery commander, but with the infantry commander. Based on 
the task he received from his superior, he determined the location 
62  UK WO, G.S. Publications 827, Artillery Training Volume III–Field Gunnery–
Pamphlet No. 6: Programme Shoots (Barrages and Concentrations) (hereafter 
Programme Shoots), (London: War Office, 1942), 1.
63  Bidwell, Gunners at War, 136–150.
64  UK WO, Programme Shoots, 1.
65  Ibid., 7.
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of the objective, or objectives; the frontage of the attack; and the 
start line of the attacking troops. 66 Determining the frontage of the 
attack was extremely important as it established the number and 
type of artillery regiments that were required to support the attack. 
The linear frontage of a troop of 25-pounders was 140 yards, and 
a battery 280 yards. Standard operating procedure dictated a field 
artillery regiment to fire two batteries side by side, with the third 
battery superimposed across the whole regimental frontage, slightly 
more in depth. Thus, a field artillery regiment produced an artillery 
barrage with a frontage of 560 yards. This distance was deemed 
acceptable to support tank assaults, but, in the case of an infantry 
assault, regimental frontages were reduced to 400 yards in order to 
provide more weight to the fire.67 The location of the start line of 
the attacking troops was also critical as it determined the location 
of the opening line—the line where the fire from the barrage was 
intended to begin. As the intent of the barrage was to provide as 
much protection as possible to the assaulting troops, it was important 
that the barrage opening line be as close as possible to the forward 
edge of the attacking infantry or tanks. The assaulting troops were 
told to try to keep as close as possible to the line of fire—referred 
to in many narratives as leaning into the barrage. When using 
25-pounder howitzers, the safety distance was 150 yards, although 
this was increased to 200 yards if the guns were firing at near-to right 
angles to the line of advance—the extra fifty yard safety distance 
accommodated the splinters (jagged fragments of the steel casing of 
the round that is ejected upon its detonation) that flew to the left 
and right of the point of impact, and potentially towards the friendly 
forces.68 All of this information provided a very rough manoeuvre 
plan that the artillery commander and his staff used to develop the 
artillery-specific elements of the barrage. 
Once the rough manoeuvre plan was developed, the infantry 
commander then coordinated with his affiliated the artillery 
commander. Together, they coordinated the general form of the artillery 
support that was required, and determined how much artillery to use, 
how deep the barrage was to be, the timings of the barrage, and the 
66  Ibid., 6.
67  Ibid., 2.
68  Ibid., 2.
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rates and the density of fire. This information was critical to allow the 
artillery staff to draw up the technical details of the artillery plan.69
Having determined the conceptual form of artillery support, the 
artillery commander then convened his artillery staff to develop the 
barrage details. In the case of an attack being coordinated by a 
division, the responsibility for the initial technical artillery calculations 
fell to the senior staff officer in the divisional artillery headquarters, 
the brigade major Royal Artillery (bmrA).70 This was a crucial stage 
in the development of the barrage as the calculations produced by 
the divisional artillery staff determined the amount and nature of 
ammunition that was required to support the attack. As the batteries 
would likely not have sufficient ammunition in their own stocks, this 
in turn dictated the subsequent ammunition delivery plan that the 
Royal Canadian Army Service Corps was required to execute.71 
The divisional artillery staff then developed a barrage map and 
task table for distribution to all participating regiments. This map 
included a schematic trace of the barrage incorporated onto which 
was a series of parallel lines dictating where the batteries would fire 
(see Figure iii). As time progressed, in accordance with the task 
table, batteries “lifted” their fire—meaning to move it—to the next 
line on the schematic. Usually these lines were spaced a minimum 
of one hundred yards apart, although the anticipated speed of the 
69  Ibid., 6.
70  Ibid., 35.
71  Ibid., 7.
Figure iii: Example of a Barrage 
Trace showing regimental “lanes” and 
lettered lines of fire. To the left a battery 
“lane” is included for ‘P’ Battery of 
9th Field Regiment. [Artillery Training 
Volume III, Pamphlet 6]
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assault determined their actual distance.72 The divisional artillery 
staff then divided the width of the whole barrage into regimental 
“lanes”—the width of each based on the frontage mentioned above, 
either 400 or 560 yards, and issued a grid reference to a point, often 
the right-most point, on the regimental lane to indicate where the 
adjutants would start the calculations for their own regiment.73 The 
actual frontage was determined by the density of fire required in 
that particular sector.74 Each participating regiment was allocated a 
lane for which it was responsible. Once this was complete, the crA 
presented the plan to the manoeuvre commander to receive his final 
approval. Upon his approval, the divisional artillery staff issued the 
barrage map and task table to the participating regiments.
Once the cps at each of the participating regiment’s received the 
orders, the Adjutant divided his regiment’s assigned lane into battery 
lanes, starting from the grid issued by the divisional artillery staff. If, 
for example, this grid was the right-most grid of the regimental lane, 
the adjutant then moved leftwards along the regimental lane and 
divided it into two battery lanes. He assigned these two battery lanes 
to two batteries, and then tasked the third battery to superimpose its 
fire across the whole of regimental frontage, one line deeper than the 
other two batteries.75 The adjutant then issued the regimental orders 
to each of the three battery cps in his regiment. It was at the battery 
cps that the majority of the finite technical calculations were made 
under the supervision of the battery cpo.
Upon receipt of the regimental orders, the battery cpo ordered 
the two gpos from the subordinate troops to report to the battery 
cp. Once there, the three officers produced gun programmes, which 
were forms that provided the gun detachment commanders with 
all of the information they required to orient and fire their gun 
throughout the programme.76 Based on these gun programmes, the 
detachment commanders and their crews prepared their ammunition, 
set their watches, and at the appointed time, executed the fire plan 
in accordance with the gun programme. Stop watches were normally 
used on the gun line, but if unavailable, each detachment commander 
72  Ibid., 3.
73  Ibid., 8.
74  Ibid., 8.
75  Ibid., 22.
76  Ibid., 15.
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would set his watch so that it would read 12 o’clock at zero hour77 
Thus, from the rough manoeuvre plan drawn up by the division 
commander, or higher, the fire plan travelled down the hierarchical 
chain of command, at each level becoming more and more finite 
in its details, until finally reaching the men who actually fired the 
gun. Having reviewed the theory behind the fire support system, let 
us now look at a practical example of how that system was used to 
support a tactical operation, the 2nd Canadian Division’s attack on 
Verrieres Ridge on, 20 July 1944.
verrières ridge: the manoeuvre plan
The first step in developing the fire plan for the 2nd Canadian 
Division’s attack was to develop the manoeuvre plan. The 2nd 
Division’s attack on 20 July was part of a larger operation that fell 
under the aegis of Operations “Goodwood” and “Atlantic.” As part of 
Montgomery’s overall plan to maintain pressure on the eastern front 
of the Allied bridgehead, and thus free up Americans in the west, 
Operation “Goodwood” was designed to penetrate in depth to the 
south-east of the city of Caen. By 19 July this attack had sputtered 
out and the the Second Canadian Corps, under the command of 
Major General Guy Simonds, ordered 2nd Canadian Division to 
maintain offensive pressure south of Caen in the direction of Verrieres 
Ridge and Falaise.78 Simonds intended to use this attack to secure 
ground from which further offensive action could be launched.79
Simonds’ tactical philosophy was one in which he believed that it 
was necessary for a division to attack on a narrow, single-brigade front. 
His justification for this policy reflected the importance he placed 
on employing overwhelming fire support to facilitate manoeuvre. 
He maintained that any attack must be “supported by all available 
artillery” and, despite the large amount of artillery available in a 
divisional artillery, it was “only sufficient to support attack by one 
brigade.”80 To this end, the tactical policy of the Second Canadian 
77  Ibid., 19.
78  John Maker, “The Essex Scottish Regiment in Operation Atlantic: What Went 
Wrong?,” Canadian Military History 18, no. 1, (Spring 2009), 8.
79  Copp, Fields of Fire, 148.
80  “Operational Policy, 2 Cdn Corps” in Fields of Fire, 272–273.
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Corps was to concentrate all resources at a single point that was 
attacked by a single brigade. Thus, for the 2nd Canadian Division’s 
attack on Verrieres Ridge, the brigade assigned the task of carrying 
it out was the 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade.
While it was a 6th Brigade show, Simonds and his staff were 
nonetheless deeply involved in the planning of the attack. Simonds 
held a conference at 2:00 a.m. on 20 July, during which he expressed 
his intent for the 6th Brigade to attack and capture the towns of 
St. Andre and St. Martin, and the Verrieres feature. Intelligence 
indicated that the ridge was held by a thin defensive line of infantry, 
so the staff at the Second Canadian Corps were relatively optimistic 
of the prospects of success for a quick offensive action.81 The plan 
of attack was to assault with three battalions in line, and one in 
depth, supported by direct fire from tank elements (See Map i). 
On the right, Winnipeg’s Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders of 
Canada were tasked to capture St. Andre. In the centre, the South 
Saskatchewan Regiment’s objective was the ground to the east of St. 
81  LAC, RG 24-C-3, Volume 14116, 14117, WD 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade (6 
CIB), 20 July 1944.
Map i: 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade Scheme of Manoeuvre, 20 July 1944. ©David Grebstad, 2015.
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Andre and, on the left, Montreal’s Fusiliers Mont Royal were ordered 
to secure Verrieres Ridge near a place called Troteval Farm. In order 
to bolster the force, the 6th Brigade was allocated Windsor’s Essex 
Scottish Regiment from the 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade, whose 
scheme of manoeuvre was to move behind the South Saskatchewans 
and secure the ground just to their north. Additionally, the brigade 
was allocated the 27th Canadian Armoured Regiment for direct fire 
support.82 This armoured regiment detached their ‘A’ Squadron to 
support the Camerons on the right, ‘C’ Squadron, although reduced 
in strength to two troops of a total of seven tanks, supported the 
Fusiliers Mont Royal, with the detached troop covering the left flank 
of the Saskatchewans. ‘B’ Squadron, having helped the Black Watch 
to secure the town of Ifs the day previous, was held in reserve to 
support any threatened portion of the line and maintain observation 
over the Verrieres feature.83 
A critical component of Canadian tactical doctrine was the 
establishment of an anti-tank screen to defeat German armoured 
counter-attacks. In support of the 6th Brigade was a battery from 
the 2nd Anti-Tank Regiment, rcA, as well as the 33rd Self-Propelled 
Anti-Tank Battery.84 From these units, each infantry battalion was 
allocated either a troop of 6-pounder or 17-pounder anti-tank guns, 
while the Saskatchewans received an extra troop of 17-pounders.85
verrieres ridge: the fire plan
The fire support plan was devised by the crA of the 2nd Canadian 
Division, Brigadier Ralph Keefler.86 For the assault, Keefler 
arranged a tremendous amount of fire support that incorporated 
the fire of twenty-eight artillery regiments during the preliminary 
bombardment three hours prior to the attack.87 During the attack, 
82  LAC, RG 24-C-3, Volume 14116, 14117, WD, 6 CIB, “Confirmatory Notes Comds 
Conference 200200B hrs,” 20 July 1944.
83  LAC, RG 24-C-3, Volume 14116, 14117, WD, 6 CIB, 19 Jul 44; LAC RG-C-3 Vol. 
14287, WD 27th Canadian Armoured Regiment (Sher Fus R), 20 July 1944.
84  LAC, RG 24-C-3, Volume 14116, 14117, WD, 6 CIB, “Confirmatory Notes Comds 
Conference 200200B hrs” 20 July 1944.
85  Ibid.
86  Ibid.
87  Canada, Six Years of 6 Canadian Field Regiment September 1939 – September 
1945, 54.
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in addition to the organic artillery regiments of the 2nd Canadian 
Divisional Artillery, the 6th Brigade also had the fire support of the 
3rd Canadian Divisional Artillery, the 2nd Canadian AgrA and the 
8th (uk) AgrA.88 
At the tactical level, the control of the fire support was delegated 
to the lowest possible level. As the tactical manoeuvre commander was 
the commander of the 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade, Brigadier H.A. 
Young, the co of his affiliated artillery regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel 
A.M. Keefler (no relation to the crA) of the 6th Field Regiment, 
rcA, was designated the crA’s rep.89 Augmenting the artillery fire 
was close air support from the Royal Air Force’s (rAf) 83 Group 
flying rocket-firing Typhoons.90 These aircraft were tasked to seek 
targets of opportunity in the depth of the German defensive lines, 
specifically in the area of Fontenoy le Marmion and Rocquencourt 
South.91 Additionally, the rAf would engage the high ground to the 
west of the 6th Brigade to prevent the enemy from observing the 
attacking troops and directing German artillery onto them.92 
Brigadier Keefler’s fire plan was designed to accommodate an 
infantryman’s rate of advance of 100 yards every three minutes.93 
Each line of fire was 700 yards in depth and timed to lift to the 
next line of fire as the friendly infantry moved close to the impacting 
artillery rounds. Indicative of how important it was to have fire 
support in place on time, the timing for H-hour was delayed from 
12:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m. in order to allow sufficient time to ensure 
that air force assets were available to augment the artillery fire, and 
to ensure that foos could reach their assigned battalions in time.94
the fire plan commences
88  LAC, RG 24-C-3, Volume 14116, 14117, WD, 6 CIB, “Confirmatory Notes Comds 
Conference 200200B hrs,” 20 July 1944.
89  Canada, Six Years, 54.
90  Nicholson, The Gunners of Canada, 297.
91  LAC, RG 24-C-3, Volume 14116, 14117, WD, 6 CIB, “Confirmatory Notes Comds 
Conference 200200B hrs,” 20 July 1944.
92  LAC, RG 24-C-3, Volume 14116, 14117, WD, 6 CIB, 19 Jul 1944.
93  LAC, RG 24-C-3, Volume 14116, 14117, WD, 6 CIB, “Confirmatory Notes Comds 
Conference 200200B hrs,” 20 July 1944.
94  LAC, RG 24-C-3, Volume 14116, 14117, WD, 6 CIB, 20 Jul 1944
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Blackburn was on his battery’s gun line to witness the preliminary 
bombardment that occurred three hours prior to the fire plan:
At noon on July 20 … the villages of St. Andre-sur-Orne and St. Martin-
de-Fontenay, sitting cheek by jowl down on the right from Verrieres 
Ridge [were] subjected to a “murder target” [all guns available] shelling 
by all field guns of 2nd and 3rd [Canadian] Divisions and all the 
mediums and heavies of three AGRAs. In just three minutes, 59 tons of 
shells (60 percent more than were fired during the Battle of Waterloo) 
[were] sent screaming and crashing into the twin hamlets by six 
regiments of 25-pounders firing 1,728 rounds, nine medium regiments 
firing 648 100-pound sells, and two regiments of 7.2–inch heavies firing 
48 200-pound monsters.95
Twenty minutes prior to H-hour the artillery fired a concentration 
on a suspected German location centered on Tilly-la-Campagne using 
“predicted” fire at a rate of 3 rounds-per-gun, per minute for ten 
minutes. After this intense bombardment, a ten minute pause allowed 
the guns to shift their points of aim onto their next target, which 
was the first line of the barrage. At H-hour, the two-and-a-half hour 
barrage commenced (see Map ii). Along the gun-lines of seven field 
artillery regiments, three medium artillery regiments, two medium 
batteries and four heavy batteries, Canadian and British gunners 
unleashed a maelstrom of high explosive only a few hundred meters 
in front of the assaulting infantry as they stepped off their start line.96
It was critical for the infantry to “lean-in” to the barrage and get 
as close as possible to it in order to minimise the time between the 
lifting of the artillery fire that was suppressing the enemy, and the 
arrival of assaulting infantry onto the defender’s positions. This left 
the defenders little time to recover from the suppressive effects of the 
artillery fire and engage the attacking infantry. Because the barrage 
employed during the 6th Brigade attack was a box barrage, the fire 
remained stationary until the infantry neared the opening line at 
which time it lifted onto targets further in depth.
95  Blackburn, The Guns of Normandy, 181.
96  LAC, RG 24-C-3, Volume 14116, 14117, WD, 6 CIB, 19 July 1944.
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The Fusiliers Mont Royal leaned well into the barrage, so 
much so at least two men were wounded by friendly artillery fire.97 
The fire plan was initially successful in suppressing many of the 
German defenders and preventing them from engaging the assaulting 
Canadians with their small-arms.98 ‘C’ Company of the Fusiliers 
Mont Royal captured thirty German soldiers who were struck dumb 
by the barrage. On arrival at their objective, Troteval Farm, they 
took another twenty-five prisoners one of whom was an ss captain.99 
Another captured German soldier, who had fought at Stalingrad, 
reported to his interrogators that he had never before experienced 
that level of shelling.100 These testimonials indicate how important 
97  A. Britton Smith, “A FOO at Troteval Farm 20–21 July 1944,” Canadian Military 
History 14, No. 4, (Autumn 2005), 67–74.
98  R.W. Queen-Hughes, Whatever Men Dare, A History of The Queens Own 
Cameron Highlanders of Canada, 1935–1960 (Winnipeg: Bullman Brothers Limited, 
1960), 103.
99  Le Comité historique, Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal, Cent ans d’histoire d’un régiment 
canadien-français, Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal 1869–1969 (Ottawa: Le Comite 
historique, 1971), 201.
100  Blackburn, The Guns of Normandy, 181.
Map ii: The Fire Plan in support of the 6th Canadian Brigade’s Manoeuvre Plan. ©David 
Grebstad, 2015.
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the use of massive concentrated fire support was to facilitating 
Canadian manoeuvre.
A key element often overlooked in these narratives is the herculean 
efforts of the Royal Canadian Army Service Corps and the gunners 
working in the ammunition parties to deliver the necessary ammunition 
to the guns. Shortly after midnight on 19 July, ammunition trucks 
arrived at the gun positions and delivered 350 rounds-per-gun or a 
total of 25,200 rounds for all the guns in the 2nd Canadian Divisional 
Artillery.101 At 9:00 p.m. on 20 July another ammunition dump of 
450 rounds-per-gun occurred to replenish the rounds fired since the 
opening of the barrage. Several hours later, another 100 rounds-
per-gun were dropped on the positions. In each case, these rounds 
needed to be loaded on the trucks at the ammunition depot, and then 
driven forward to gun positions where they were delivered as close as 
possible to each gun, terrain permitting. Ammunition also had to be 
stored in “ammo pits” that were dug into the earth near the howitzer 
to minimise any blast should an enemy round land too close to the 
store of ammunition. This was no light work, particularly when the 
gun detachment was still expected to fire their gun in accordance 
with the gun programme. The rounds came packaged in a steel box 
containing four projectiles and cartridge casings (the brass casings 
that held the propellant charges), and each box weighed 117 pounds. 
In the case of the 4th Field Regiment, rcA the truck carrying the 
ammunition sank into mud up to its axle so the rounds had to be 
carried by hand from the road to the gun itself.102
For the first couple of hours, the assault seemed to be going 
according to plan. At 5:00 p.m. the Saskatchewans reported that 
two companies were on their objectives. At 5:40 p.m. a similar report 
was received at 6th Brigade Headquarters from the Camerons. The 
situation seemed satisfactory enough that the brigade commander 
ordered the Essex Scots forward at 5:30 p.m.103 An axiom of 
military operations is that no plan survives contact with the enemy. 
Unfortunately for the 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade, the German 
army still had their card to play.
101  Ibid., 495.
102  Ibid., 201.
103  LAC, RG 24-C-3, Volume 14116, 14117, WD, 6 CIB, 20 Jul 1944.
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the bite that didn’t hold
Despite the overall effectiveness of the fire plan, there were bound to 
be some hiccups. In the centre, the Saskatchewans were ambushed 
by infantry of the German 272nd Division and forced to ground by 
fire. Consequently, they “lost the barrage.”104 It is here that it is 
important to note the functioning of the fire support system. The 
batteries fire in accordance with the tasks delivered them by the task 
table and have no contact with the supporting infantry, save for the 
foos and bcs that are moving with them. If enemy fire is sufficiently 
severe to slow or stop the advancing infantry, the artillery barrage 
will carry on unless ordered otherwise by the foo or bc. It appears 
in the case of the Saskatchewans that did not happen.
The optimistic first two-and-a-half hours of the attack evolved 
into two days of fierce and incessant German counterattacks. Across 
the whole 6th Brigade frontage the Germans counter-attacked 
almost immediately. Most surprisingly, to the Canadians, was the 
appearance of German tanks in support of these counterattacks. The 
6th Brigade’s war diary notes that the first indication of German 
tanks started to filter back to the brigade hq at 5:50 p.m.105 The key 
to bite and hold was to have sufficient time to consolidate on the 
objective and deploy anti-tank guns to defeat the German counter 
attack. Unfortunately, nowhere along the 6th Brigade’s frontage was 
that accomplished. In the centre, the Saskatchewans were engaged by 
German infantry and tanks shortly after arriving at their objective. 
In the firefight, the Saskatchewans lost all of their anti-tank guns.106 
Shortly thereafter, the Essex Scottish arrived on their objective to the 
north of the Saskatchewans and, almost immediately, German tanks 
appeared and knocked out an entire troop of 17-pounder anti-tank 
guns of the 2nd Anti-Tank Regiment, rcA.107 On the left, the foo 
supporting the Fusiliers Mont Royal, Captain Arthur Smith, observed 
the beginnings of the German counter-attacks from Troteval Farm:
At first their attacks are infantry only, and we are able to cope with 
them reasonably well with our artillery fire, but when they begin coming 
104  Maker, “The Essex Scottish Regiment in Operation Atlantic,” 9.
105  LAC, RG 24-C-3, Volume 14116, 14117, WD, 6 CIB, 20 Jul 1944.
106  George B. Buchanan, The March of the Prairie Men: A Story of the South 
Saskatchewan Regiment (Ottawa: CEF, 2009), 26.
107  Blackburn, The Guns of Normandy, 188.
30
Canadian Military History, Vol. 25 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 14
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol25/iss1/14
  31GREB S TAD
with tanks, we realize the jig is up. We have no anti-tank guns, no 
PIAT [Projector, Infantry, Anti-Tank, a shoulder-fired anti-tank weapon] 
ammunition and the [Fusiliers Mont Royal] are very thin on the ground.108
To make matters worse, the weather turned especially sour. 
Smith tried to call a Typhoon to engage a German self-propelled gun 
that was engaging Canadian tanks, but he found that all aircraft 
were grounded, and there was no prospect for any air support from 
the 83rd Group, rAf.109 Exacerbating the problem, the tanks of the 
27th Canadian Armoured Regiment (cAr) were unable to render 
assistance due to the limited visibility created by the weather.110 
Hitherto, the tanks gave good service during the initial assault, 
providing direct fire support from positions of observation near the 
start line. They had moved into position by 1:00 p.m. on 20 July and, 
at the time of the assault, adopted positions of fire. ‘A’ Squadron, on 
the right in support of the Camerons, moved forward when it came 
in contact with enemy tanks and adopted a position northeast of St. 
Andre where it was later engaged by a large number of enemy tanks 
just prior to last light. When the initial counter-attacks began at 
6:00 p.m. on 20 July, ‘B’ Squadron, originally in reserve, was ordered 
forward to reinforce ‘A’ Squadron.111 But, as was their doctrine, the 
tanks withdrew into a laager after last light. During the 6th Brigade 
assault the tankers of the 27th Canadian Armoured Regiment engaged 
and destroyed a number of German tanks and vehicles; the after-action 
report indicated twenty-six confirmed and three probable kills. Despite 
this impressive count, the tankers themselves suffered a large number of 
casualties.112 ‘C’ Squadron began the operation with depleted numbers 
as they were down to only six tanks on the morning of 21 July, hence 
the reason it was ordered to remain in reserve. Later that day when 
the co of the 27th cAr ordered his tanks into a laager at 10:00 p.m., 
only thirty-three of the regiment’s fifty-seven tanks were fighting fit.113 
108  Arthur Smith quoted in Blackburn, The Guns of Normandy, 191.
109  Smith, “A FOO at Troteval Farm 20–21 July 1944,” 71.
110  Maker, “The Essex Scottish Regiment in Operation Atlantic,” 12.
111  LAC, RG 24-C-3, Volume 14116, 14117, WD, 6 CIB, 19 Jul 44; LAC RG-C-3 Vol. 
14287, WD 27th Canadian Armoured Regiment (Sher Fus R), 20 July 1944.
112  27 Cdn Armd Regt (Sher Fus) CAC Op ATLANTIC Overture to the Breakthrough, 
n.p. Available at: www.canadianmilitaryhistory.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/
OP-atlantic.pdf [accessed 19 May 2015], 22.
113  Ibid., 7.
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By 22 July, ‘A’ Squadron, although it rolled out of the laager the day 
previous with fifteen tanks, was down to only six.114 
Like their armoured confreres, the gunners made a valiant 
effort to assist the 6th Brigade in holding its “bite.” On the left, 
Smith recalls that he and the Fusiliers “held on at Troteval Farm 
largely because of terrific artillery fire, which amounted to over 600 
rounds-per-gun for 4th Field … mostly fired on “Mike” [regimental] 
targets.”115 When a tank engaged the fusiliers, Smith bombarded 
him with medium artillery. He recalled that he “hammered him for 
about half an hour. I may not have knocked him out, but I’ll bet 
I loosened the bowels of that crew.”116 In the centre, the foo with 
the Essex Scottish brought down considerable fire on the attacking 
German infantry who had closed up with the Canadians. So close 
were the counter-attacking Germans, he found that the only way to 
engage the enemy with effective defensive fire was to call for fire on 
his own position.117 Although the Camerons on the right enjoyed the 
only real success during the first day, they were soon to bear the 
brunt of the German counter attacks at dawn on 22 July when they 
were subjected to brutal mortar and artillery fire along with infantry 
and tank attacks. They credited their affiliated battery commander, 
Major R.E. Lucy, of the 13th Battery for saving the day. No one on 
the gun line knew what was happening, but they sensed the situation 
was grim when Lucy radioed the 6th Field Regiment’s command post, 
indicated the target grid and ordered them to “fire like hell until told 
to stop.”118Despite this departure from artillery fire discipline, which 
is the rigidly observed artillery radio voice procedure, the batteries 
obliged and the firing went on for forty-five minutes until “the paint 
peeled off, the guns were red hot, the gunners sweating and happy.”119 
Such an overwhelming amount of fire support demanded that the 
already weary ammunition truck drivers redouble their efforts to 
resupply the guns. Blackburn recalled that by mid-afternoon of 21 
July, most of the original dump of ammunition had been expended, 
necessitating the rush delivery of another 350 round per gun. The 
ammunition arrived just in time, when the German counterattacks 
114  Ibid., 11.
115  Smith, “A FOO at Troteval Farm 20–21 July 1944,” 72.
116  Arthur Smith quoted by Blackburn, The Guns of Normandy, 191.
117  Captain Grange quoted by Blackburn, The Guns of Normandy, 189.
118  Canada, Six Years, 56.
119  Ibid., 56.
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were at their most frenzied. When the ammunition arrived at the 
4th Field Regiment battery positions, Blackburn’s battery had only 
twelve rounds-per-gun remaining!120
Despite the valourous efforts of the 6th Canadian Infantry 
Brigade, the 27th Canadian Armoured Regiment and the fire support 
team, the operation ended poorly. In the center, the Essex Scottish 
and Saskatchewans withdrew, leaving a dangerous salient between 
the Camerons and the Fusiliers. At 6:00 p.m. on 21 July an attack 
by the Black Watch of Canada, supported by tanks and artillery 
fire, re-established the front in the centre.121 The front was stabilised 
along the road between Troteval and St. Andre although Troteval 
itself was lost.122 At Troteval Farm, ‘C’ Company of the Fusiliers 
Mont Royal repelled a total of five German counter-attacks on 21 
July alone before being ordered to withdraw.123 By 23 July the front 
was tenuously stabilised and the Second Canadian Corps started 
preparations for the next operation to seize Verrieres Ridge.
conclusion
The fact that the 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade’s attack was 
unsuccessful does not negate its value as an analytical tool to help 
understand the artillery-based doctrine of bite and hold, and the 
fire support system that was integral to it. Quite the contrary, it is 
an excellent tool to demonstrate the intricacies, systems, procedures 
and limitations of that doctrine. 
Firstly, the operation demonstrates the importance placed on the 
centralisation of fire support. For this attack, the fire of all of the 
2nd and the 3rd Canadian Divisional Artilleries was allocated to 6th 
Canadian Infantry Brigade, along with reinforcing fire from the Second 
Canadian Corps, flanking Corps’ and at least two AgrAs. This type of 
centralisation was a critical element of the bite and hold doctrine.
Secondly, understanding the structure of the fire support system, 
makes it easier to understand how it functioned. Rather than simply 
120  Blackburn, The Guns of Normandy, 206–207.
121  Stacey, Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War Volume 
III, 176.
122  Ibid.
123  LAC, RG 24-C-3, Volume 14116, 14117, WD, 6 CIB, 21 Jul 1944.
33
Grebstad: Fire Plan
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2016
34 The Canadian Army’s Fire Support System in Normandy
dismissing the barrage as a wall of fire that rolls on ahead of the 
assaulting infantry, one understands the numerous and intricate 
systems and procedures that overlay the organisational structure and 
allow it to function. It is then easier to understand why a barrage 
was, or was not, effective. Understanding the relationship between the 
infantry battalion commander, the bc and the foos helps to understand 
why the artillery based doctrine was critical to “shooting” the infantry 
on to the objective and then defeating the German counter-attacks.
Finally, this operation serves to illustrate the limitations of the 
bite and hold doctrine. When poor weather grounded the close air 
support, there was no air interdiction to prevent German artillery from 
engaging the attacking Canadians, and the troops of the 6th Canadian 
Infantry Brigade suffered as a result. When the German counter-attack 
materialised before the anti-tank guns could be emplaced and when 
visibility limited the Canadian tankers’ ability to provide direct fire 
support, the Canadian troops were hard-put, and in many circumstances 
unable, to hold their ground. In the end, all that the 6th Canadian 
Infantry Brigade had for support was the artillery. The gunners 
in support of the Brigade did good service to support the infantry, 
but even with the massive amount of artillery support available, the 
Brigade was unable to complete its initial mission. Although a critical 
part of the bite and hold doctrine, the artillery was still only one part.
During Canadian Army operations in Normandy, artillery fire 
support was a critical factor for success. Whether intimidated by fears of 
the artillery’s technical nuances, or simply mesmerized by the glamour of 
the manoeuvre element, historians have overlooked the details of the fire 
support element to their detriment and left a valuable part of the narrative 
untapped. Hopefully this paper has in some way served to remedy that.
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